By Byeong Ho Kang, Quan Bai
This e-book constitutes the refereed court cases of the twenty ninth Australasian Joint convention on man made Intelligence, AI 2016, held in Hobart, TAS, Australia, in December 2016.
The forty complete papers and 18 brief papers awarded including eight invited brief papers have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 121 submissions. The papers are prepared in topical sections on brokers and multiagent structures; AI purposes and ideas; enormous facts; constraint delight, seek and optimisation; wisdom illustration and reasoning; computer studying and knowledge mining; social intelligence; and textual content mining and NLP.
The lawsuits additionally includes 2 contributions of the AI 2016 doctoral consortium and six contributions of the SMA 2016.
Read or Download AI 2016: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 29th Australasian Joint Conference, Hobart, TAS, Australia, December 5-8, 2016, Proceedings PDF
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Additional resources for AI 2016: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 29th Australasian Joint Conference, Hobart, TAS, Australia, December 5-8, 2016, Proceedings
Here we continue this work to three other well-motivated semantics: the ideal, naive, and stage semantics. The latter two are not admissibility-based. We show that the naive semantics does not support strategic argumentation, in the sense that the outcome of the game is determined by the initial state, if the players are not corrupt. As a result, the semantics is corruption-proof. We show that the ideal semantics is resistant to both collusion and espionage. The stage semantics is resistant to espionage, but its resistance to collusion depends on the strategic aims of the players.
We assume there are two players, a proponent P and her opponent O. A split argumentation framework (ACom , AP , AO , ) consists of three sets of arguments: ACom the arguments that are common knowledge to P and O; AP the arguments availover able to P , and AO the arguments available to O; and an attack relation ACom ∪ AP ∪ AO . AP is assumed to be unknown to O, and AO is unknown to P . Each player is aware of restricted to the arguments they know. We assume that P ’s desired outcome is that a distinguished argument a is accepted, Corrupt Strategic Argumentation: The Ideal and the Naive 21 in some sense, while O’s aim is to prevent this.
For example, for the unrejected aim, if AO contains an argument b that attacks a and is not self-defeating then O simply has to play b in order to win. Furthermore, additional arguments do not aﬀect the existence of b, so it is suﬃcient for O to play her entire set of arguments AO at her ﬁrst move. She does not even need to know what the focal argument is! Theorem 5. Consider strategic argumentation under the naive semantics where P and O are honest. Suppose that P can make an initial move that includes the focal argument a.